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ABSTRACT 
NORTH-AFRICAN IMMIGRATION TO FRANCE:  Economic Benefit or Burden? 
 
 
 
 Over the past several years, France has had a steadily increasing immigrant 
population.  Most of these immigrants come from fellow European nations, but North-
Africans follow closely behind as the second largest group of French immigrants.  The 
ever-increasing Maghrebian population in urban areas has caused hostility from French 
natives as social unrest rises in response to the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008.  
The goal of this thesis is two-fold.  First, it aims to show the growing intolerance that 
North-Africans are experiencing in French society.  And second, it will examine the 
consequences of North-African immigration on the labor market outcomes of the French 
natives in an attempt to reveal that the present level of intolerance is unwarranted at least 
under economic premises.  
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
 Americans have many stereotypes about the French.  We tend to conjure an image 
of someone wearing a black and white striped shirt along with a red beret, holding a 
cigarette in one hand while three baguettes rest under the arm, standing bored in front of 
the Eiffel Tower murmuring about the advantages of socialism and liberal thought.  In the 
spring of 2013, I spent a semester abroad from my native United States to study in 
Angers, France, and I got to learn more about these stereotypes first-hand.  The baguettes 
proved especially true, but the stereotype of leftist idealism pervading the French public 
opinion was shown to be a grave misconception for me. 
 The reality of the very divisive French political arena made itself known to me at 
dinner one evening with my girlfriend, her roommates, and their host mother when our 
hostess off-handedly asked us our opinions of the Iraq War.  I didn’t give the question too 
much thought, but afterward she began to speak very openly about her utter dislike of 
Arabs.  She claimed that Arabs were  “un parasite” on the true Frenchmen by stealing 
their social benefits and that Islam would be the death of their culture.  I was stunned that 
she was willing to so openly berate an entire group of people.  But I was appalled when I 
learned over the course of that semester that many amongst the French share her opinion 
of Arabs and their culture. 
 Racism has been a very serious issue culturally for me throughout my life.  I was 
born and raised in the South.  It’s a subject that’s ingrained into the history of the region.  
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Finding that a rather large group of Frenchmen holds a sentiment that so negatively 
reflects and stereotypes my own home weighed heavily upon me.  Thus, I aim to expose 
the fruitlessness of this sort of racism by proving that North-Africans are economically 
beneficial for France and not the burden that anti-immigration French believe.  I will 
focus specifically on North-Africans because they are the group of French Arabs most 
affected by this intolerance, as will be shown in chapter one. 
 The history of North-African immigration to France begins at the end of World 
War II.  With a desperate need for a stronger working force to rebuild the economy 
during the post-war period, France opened its borders and greatly relaxed immigration 
laws to allow for a larger working force.  Many peoples from less developed nations 
began to take up these opportunities in France.  Some of the most important nations of 
immigrants to France came from North-Africa just before the end of imperialist 
conquests.  From 1945-1974, four out of every five Maghrebian immigrants were granted 
refugee status because of the on-going conflicts throughout the area, particularly in 
Algeria.  And in the case of Algeria, once the Algerian War of Independence ended, from 
1962 to 1975 the number of Algerian immigrants in France increased from 350,000 to 
700,000 (Deux Siècles d’histoire).  And that number has only continued to grow. 
 It’s not difficult to understand why North-Africans have immigrated over the past 
half century.  Generally speaking, France has more opportunities, better jobs, and some 
of the best health care in the world, especially in comparison to most of the developing 
world (World Health Organization 2010).  All legal residents are covered under France’s 
nationalized health insurance.  Also, health insurance is free until age 20 for students, and 
education is free until the university level— at which point it is heavily subsidized by the 
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government anyway.  So even if immigrants can’t become legalized citizens and must 
live as sans papiers, there are obvious advantages to moving to France.  But, as this thesis 
will show, the French have become very unwelcoming especially after the global 
economic crisis.  Despite the social burden that immigrants may pose, this thesis will 
prove that they are actually providing an economic gain for the French labor market. 
 To accomplish this goal, chapter one reveals the intolerance and prejudice 
towards Arabs that has begun to become very apparent in French public discourse.  The 
chapter opens by examining current events and recent, political scandals involving 
immigrants in the French media before moving the discussion to racist remarks from 
specific public officials.  Then the focus narrows onto French racism targeted specifically 
at the North-African and Muslim populations. 
 Chapter two examines the history of France’s relations with the each of the 
nations of the Maghreb in order to better explain why these intolerant sentiments have 
grown over the past several years.  By studying the histories of the relationships between 
France and the three North-African nations that have had the biggest impact on France’s 
immigrant population (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia respectively), this thesis shows 
how past historical conflict has continued to manifest in present intolerance. 
 In chapter three, this thesis will discuss a brief history of the scholarly study of the 
effects of immigration on the labor market, including the evolution of the particular 
models for testing these effects.  This will provide a foundation to present the model that 
this study will utilize. 
 And chapter four will closely follow a model developed by Anthony Edo, who 
analyzed the effects of the total immigrant population on the French labor market.  With 
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his work, this thesis will be able to adjust his model to analyze the effects of the 
exclusively Maghrebian population of immigrants on the wages and employment levels 
of natives over the course of several years across multiple education and skill groups.   
 The results of these findings will be reported in the final conclusive chapter.  
Possibilities for improvements on the model will also be given.  Lastly, policy 
recommendations will be given based on the findings of how North-African immigration 
affects the French economy. 
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CHAPTER I:  Contemporary Views of the Maghreb in France 
 
 
 After the recent scandal concerning the far-right paper Minute comparing 
Guyanese-born Justice Minister Christiane Taubira to a monkey, race has once again 
become a subject of considerable debate for the French.  In October of 2013, Anne-
Sophie Leclere, formerly the Front National’s mayoral candidate in Rethel, called 
Taubira a monkey on television and claimed she would prefer to see the Justice Minister 
“in a tree swinging from the branches rather than in government.”  Additionally, Leclere 
posted a picture to her Facebook with “before and after” photos that, once again, likened 
Taubira to a monkey (Jespersen).  Leclere was dropped from the party’s nomination, but 
her actions represent the ever-present racism currently in the rhetoric of the right-wing 
parties of France. 
 This surmounting and overt racism is manifesting despite the Front National’s 
leader Marine Le Pen’s attempts to separate her party from its historical image of racial 
intolerance.  And other public figures have stepped forward with personal attacks on the 
Justice Minister, such as Eric Zemmour, a radio commentator who accused Taubira of 
being prejudiced against white men (The Telegraph).  Taubira responded to the remarks 
by saying, “We know what the Front National thinks:  the blacks in the branches of trees, 
Arabs in the sea, homosexuals in the Seine, Jews in the ovens and so on,” (Jespersen).  
Taubira may be South American, but the verbal attacks she has garnered from far-right 
political groups has revealed a trend towards xenophobia and outright racism amongst the 
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French people.  And, over the past three years, a considerable amount of this anger has 
been directed at the North-African, Muslim population of France.  Through statistical 
evidence of France’s growing dislike of people from different backgrounds and through 
comments made from political figures, one can easily see a developing trend toward 
North-African, Islamophobia in France. 
 First, it is important to note that the French often associate race with immigration.  
Though, many foreigners have spent their entire lives in France, if a person does not 
adapt to the French way of life, he or she will continue to be considered a foreigner (un 
étranger).  This is why the media often directs attention of acts of both racism and 
xenophobia to the same source.  But this racism takes on a different form in France as it 
is often coupled with religious intolerance.  North-Africans are not merely an immigrant 
or racial group; they are a religious group as well.  For instance, the three countries 
examined in this study (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) each have over 98 percent of 
their populations subscribing to Islam (Pew Research Center). 
 And this also explains why North-Africans are viewed so unfavorably in 
France—Islam is seen as “un-French.”  Joan Wallach Scott in her book The Politics of 
the Veil argues that the French believed someone of any culture could become French, 
but the inherent logic was that they would abandon their “inferior” culture (Stille).  So to 
adapt, foreigners must be willing to forego their non-Christian religions, which many 
immigrants are unwilling to do.  The Muslim community in particular has thus been seen 
as outsiders to the native French, who feel that the lack of integration into French society 
is a sign of isolationist communitarianism, and this has sparked criticism of the North-
Africans and Muslims in France (Hamilton). 
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 To be more specific, one can look at the statistics of French people’s feeling 
toward racism.  The National Commission for the Rights of Man (C.N.C.D.H.), which 
has been charged by the French parliament to monitor incidents of racism in France, 
noted a 23 percent increase in incidents of racism, Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism from 
2012 to 2013, and a five-fold increase over the past twenty years.  And according to a 
poll by the C.N.C.D.H., 29 percent of French people consider themselves at least “a little 
racist,” with another seven percent claiming they are “rather racist.”  Only 44 percent 
stated they were “not at all racist,” (Stille).  And of the forty-four who claimed they were 
not racist, many of them might either be lying to the poll or not realize they have racist 
tendencies. 
 Furthermore, to cite feelings of racism that target the French Muslim population, 
“A poll by the BVA institution for two anti-discrimination groups found… 28 per cent 
[of Frenchmen] think that Arabs are more likely to commit crimes than members of other 
ethnic groups, a number that has more than doubled since a similar poll was conducted 
last year,” (The Telegraph).  Also, the magazine Valeurs Actuelles showed that fewer 
French people believe immigration is a good thing, with the percent in 2013 being only 
37 percent compared to 49 percent in 2007 (Bohlen).  Overall, the French agree that 
racism has become more pronounced in France today.  According to a survey carried out 
by polling agency OpinionWay, a French polling and market research company, 59 
percent of French people believe that racism has increased in France.  And 68 percent 
believe it is more difficult to be a Muslim in France in 2013, (Jeanbart) 
 Finally, a survey carried out by the polling institute Ipsos and the Jean-Jaures 
Foundation, found that 70 percent of the French population “believe there are too many 
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foreigners living in the country and 74 percent believe Islam is not compatible with 
French society.”  Additionally “46 percent believe unemployment levels can only be cut 
by reducing immigration,” (McPartland Jan. 2013).  So there is very evident proof of 
growing resentment towards foreigners throughout France.  But the statistics are not the 
only proof of this recent antipathy. 
 These statistics have started manifesting themselves in the public’s actions 
towards Muslim immigrants.  The Committee against Islamophobia (CCIF) claimed that 
attacks against Muslims rose to 469 from 298 between 2011 and 2012; the attacks on 
mosques doubled to 40 in 2012 (RT News).  One example of these acts occurred in the 
summer of 2013 when a French soldier was arrested for planning a terrorist attack on a 
mosque.  In response, Kamel Kabtane, a French Muslim leader, spoke out against the 
“climate of Islamophobia” in France, citing a recent study which revealed that racist 
attacks had risen 60 percent overall, and according to Kabtane this increase in attacks is 
due to government inaction (RT News). 
 One of the first significant attacks on Muslims occurred in September of 2012 
when a group of about 70 young people calling themselves Generation Identity stormed a 
newly built mosque in Poitiers, France, to protest the supposed growth of Islam’s 
influence in their country.  The group hung a banner from the top of the mosque saying 
“732 Generation Identity.”  The number 732 is a reference to the year Charles Martel 
stopped the invading Muslim army in Poitiers.  The group’s website states, “We do not 
want more immigration from outside Europe or new mosque construction on French 
soil.”  The Muslim leader Kabtane stated that the government was inactive in uprooting 
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the sources of racism in France, and as proof, only four arrests were made from the attack 
on the Mosque (McPartland Oct 2012). 
 Not all attacks against Muslims are overt, however.  Muslims have become highly 
discriminated against in the French job-market.  A French study by Claire Adida revealed 
that a fictional job application with a traditionally Christian name was over two-and-a-
half times more likely to receive a response from a potential French employer than an 
equally qualified applicant with a Muslim name (Engage). 
 And more recently, on November 19th, 2013, the Grande Mosquée de Paris was 
spray-painted with anti-Islamic slogans.  This follows a similar event earlier in November 
where two mosques in Besançon were similarly marked (Schmid).  And two weeks prior 
to the spray-painting in Besançon, a mosque in Carpentras had roughy thirty meters of 
the exterior wall covered in phrases such as, “Arabs Out!” and “France for the French!”  
And in Lesparre-Médoc during the summer of 2012, two men painted swastikas on the 
outer walls of the local mosque (AFP). 
 Attacks on Muslim women have also increased significantly since the start of 
2013.  There have been a total of 14 acts of physical violence against women who were 
wearing a head covering in the Parisian suburbs of Argenteuil, Trappes, and Reims.  One 
of these attacks led to a 19-year-old Muslim girl having a miscarriage.  No arrests have 
been made for these attacks (Schmid). 
 Marwan Muhammad from the Collective against Islamophobia in France 
summarized the recent assault on Islam in France, stating, “Muslims are being 
stigmatized and presented as a problem in France… Negative signals are being sent out 
by politicians, including those on the left and this helps to empower people to take 
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action,” (McPartland, Feb. 2013).  The problem is not solely for Muslims.  Politicians 
have begun to lambast all foreigners. 
 The Roma, in particular, have been at the center of a very divisive political 
discussion for the past several months.   Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, a Paris mayoral 
candidate of the UMP, claimed that Roma harassed the public and raised the crime rate 
(The Telegraph).  Interior Minister Manuel Valls has continued former President 
Sarkozy’s high controversial policies of closing down illegal Roma encampments and 
expediting the Roma back to Romania and Bulgaria.  He has described the Roma way of 
life as “extremely different from ours,” and claimed Roma people who could not 
integrate and that those who were not working should be “delivered back to the borders,” 
a policy which is in direct conflict with France’s commitment of the free movement of 
people throughout the European Union, as stated in a conference by the EU 
Commissioner Viviane Reding (Diffley).  Additionally, in late 2013 the group MRAP 
(Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples) claimed they will be 
suing Valls for making the claim that most Roma do not want to be integrated into French 
society (Cross). 
 The most shocking aspect of this racism from Interior Minister Valls is that his 
public approval rating is at a tremendous 70-80 percent, whereas President Hollande is 
only at 20-25 percent (Diffley).  Many journalists have stated that Hollande’s record-low 
approval has prevented him from taking action against the racism in France. 
 Abdallah Zekri, the president of the National Observatory of Islamophobia in 
France believes the proliferation of anti-Muslim sentiment can be attributed to the 
“resurgence of the far right.”  One example of this resurgence is the percentage of the 
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Presidential vote that Marine Le Pen, leader of the historically xenophobic National Front 
took in 2012—17.9 percent (France 24 Nov. 2012).  And Le Pen has had quite racist 
remarks in recent history.  For instance, she compared the act of Muslims praying in the 
streets to the same type of oppression experienced during the Nazi occupation of France 
(Heneghan).  And during the 2012 Presidential election, Marine Le Pen claimed it would 
soon be “impossible to buy anything other than halal meat in France.”  But the National 
Front is not the only political party that has been very boisterous in its remarks towards 
Muslims. 
 Jean-François Copé, a competitor in the race for leadership in Sarkozy’s party, the 
UMP, has recently adopted the xenophobic platform as well.  He “claimed that Muslim 
children stole chocolate pastries from non-Muslim classmates to keep them from eating at 
school during Ramadan,” (Heneghan).  And recently, he has victimized the white 
population of France by saying that “anti-white racism” is spreading throughout France, 
as Muslims begin to change the French way of life.  The National Front condemned 
Copé’s use of the phrase but because he is attempting to steal support from their party 
and co-opt their political stances, but the party had quarrel with the sentiments of reverse-
racism. 
 Thus, discrimination against North-Africans and Muslims has become an apparent 
issue, but is the discrimination warranted?  From a sociological or humanitarian 
standpoint, the answer is obviously “no,” but the French are very worried about the 
cultural impact that this minority group may have on their way of life.  On November 6, 
the newspaper Le Parisien featured the headline “La France devient-elle racist?”  The 
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newspaper went on to cite globalization, a national identity crisis, and the economic crisis 
as the major factors for this increase in racism (Jespersen).   
 There are two distinct issues at play here.  First, many French believe that 
immigrants, particularly Arabic immigrants, are ruining the collective French culture and 
national identity.  Second, many French believe that immigrants hurt the French economy 
because they are taking jobs from the native population.  This thesis will focus solely on 
the latter issue.  While there is certainly room in academia for study on the former issue, 
the difficulty in quantifying cultural shifts due to an increase in the immigrant population 
implies that any attained results should be viewed skeptically.  By examining strictly the 
economic impacts of immigrants, one may be able to draw more conclusive results and 
allow for greater policy implications.  Thus, by examining strictly the economic impacts 
of North-African immigration on the French labor market, this thesis aims to show that 
the immigrants seeking social protections under the French government is a boon for the 
struggling economy and not the burden that many have claimed it to be.  But to 
understand the current importance of the North-African population, it is important to 
know the history of North-African immigration to France. 
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CHAPTER II: History of North-African Immigration to France 
 	  
 As shown in the previous chapter, the French have a growing aversion to North-
Africans.  But from where does this dislike stem?  To understand why French have begun 
to look unfavorably on immigration from the Maghreb, it is important to understand the 
history of France’s relationships with the region.  Furthermore, it is important to break 
down the sections of the Maghreb on which this study will focus.  Generally, the 
Maghreb is described as consisting of five nations:  (from west to east) Mauritania, 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.  According to INED, in 2008 the two countries 
with the largest percentage of first and second-generation immigrants in France were 
Algeria and Morocco with 14.3 percent and 11.0 percent respectively.  Tunisia is also 
significant with 4.4 percent of the immigrant population.  Libya and Mauritania, 
however, are both below the top 25 on the list of nations with immigration to France; 
thus, they are statistically insignificant for this study.   
 Thus these three nations will be the area of focus for examining immigration rates 
for the model in chapter four.  The histories of France’s relations with Algeria, Tunisia, 
and Morocco are generally viewed negatively because of the many years of conflict and 
the historical connotations of imperialism.  But by studying these relationships 
throughout history one can see a possible explanation as to why there is a growing 
population of French natives who are opposed to an increase in immigration from the 
Maghreb. 
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ALGERIA 
 The beginnings of relations between France and Algeria were very combative.  
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the French struggled with piracy 
from the North-African, Ottoman territory.  A century of peace developed after a treaty 
was signed in 1690, but this peace ended with the French conquest of Algeria between 
1830 and 1847 (Abun-Nasr 27). 
 The event that sparked the conquest is referred to as the Fly Whisk Incident (or 
the Fan Affair) of 1827.  France agreed to buy wheat from Algeria through two specific 
merchants in the late eighteenth century.  When Algerian officials pressed the two 
merchants to pay their debt for the wheat, they claimed that the French government had 
purchased the wheat on credit; thus, they would be unable to pay the Algerian 
government until the French officials paid off their debt to the two men.  The French 
Consul, Pierre Deval then told the Algerian government that France had never agreed to 
any arrangement with the merchants and that the French government had already paid for 
the wheat.  Believing that the Consul was in collusion with the two merchants, one of the 
leaders of the Algerian government struck Deval with his fly whisk (Abun-Nasr 47).  As 
a response, Charles X began a naval blockade against Algiers.  Upon demanding that a 
meeting be held between the two nations in France, Algerian leaders began firing 
cannons against the blockade ships. 
 The blockades proved unsuccessful, as the pirates were able to navigate the 
shorelines with ease to continue their trade, while the French merchants were unable to 
continue trade with one of the largest cities in North-Africa.  Thus, on June 14th of 1830, 
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King Charles X began the conquest of Algeria by sending over 30,000 naval troops to 
Sidi Ferruch where there was little opposition to the attack initially.  Once French siege 
weapons arrived on June 28, attacks on Algiers began.  The French entered Algiers on 
July 5th.  France officially annexed the occupied regions of Algeria in on June 22, 1834, 
claiming the nation as a colony despite continual resistance and pressure from the native 
population (Horne 49). 
 In 1836, Abd al-Qādir and his Algerian tribesmen engaged in military warfare 
against the French General Thomas Robert Bugeaud in the Battle of Sikkak.  The 
Algerian leader suffered heavy casualties and thereafter used almost exclusively guerilla-
warfare to confront the French forces.  The Treaty of Tafna in 1837 granted al-Qādir all 
the inland territories of Algeria, but when the French forces moved on Constantine in 
1839, al-Qādir claimed that the treaty had been breached and continued his attacks.  In 
response, Bugeaud implemented a scorched-earth strategy that decimated al-Qādir’s 
forces.  Having been defeated, the Algerian leader fled to Morocco.  And when the 
bordering nation refused to surrender al-Qādir to French forces, the First Franco-
Moroccan War of 1844 began (Horne 52-54). 
 By 1848, France had conquered nearly all of northern Algeria.  The Constitution 
of 1848 under the Second Republic changed Algeria’s status from a colony to a French 
department with three civil territories in Alger, Oran, and Constantine.  One of the 
reasons for this change was that the number of European immigrants to Algeria grew 
significantly throughout the conquest (Grandmaison 207).  In 1858, Napoleon III halted 
the settlement expansion, fearing that the North-African natives would cause an uprising 
out of fear from the increasing French population.  The distinctive separation of the 
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French immigrants and the natives would become increasing important in the history of 
the two nations. 
 After Napoleon III’s defeat to the Prussians, the Second Empire fell including the 
Emperor’s plans for Algeria.  The new Algerian immigrants quickly began expanding out 
into the tribal regions.  Many of the Frenchmen from the areas conceded to the Prussians 
moved to the newly available territories in North-Africa, doubling the total number of 
settlers.  Once again, this expansion was met with hostility.  A revolt occurred in 1871 
when the French refused to remunerate the Algerians for the grain supply for which the 
previous military regime had bargained, but the natives were defeated and severely 
punished with greater land confiscations and military order being issued that removed 
due process from non-Frenchmen (Horne 57-78). 
 The status quo of growing French imperialistic power remained in place for 
several decades until World War II when France allowed French Algerians to join the 
military on the mainland.  After the war, under the Fourth republic, Algerians clamored 
for equal voting rights between Muslims and non-Muslims.  The Sétif Massacre of 1945 
also incited Algerian Muslims:  French police fired on Muslim protestors, who responded 
by killing 100 French civilians; the French military then killed thousands of Algerians 
over the next few days (Aussaresses 113).  The event was a precursor to the Algerian 
War of Independence that would begin one decade later. 
 Algerian War was a series of conflicts that lasted from 1954 to 1962.  The war 
began when the National Liberation Front (FLN) attacked French civilians and soldiers 
on November 1.  However, the French did not realize the severity of the FLN’s pro-
independence claims until August of 1955 when the FLN brutally killed French civilians 
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in the Battle of Philippeville (Galula and Hoffman 62).  The French forces retaliated, 
killing over 1,000 Muslims.  On September 30th of the following year, after the FLN 
called for rebels to use terrorist tactics against the French, three bombs were placed in 
civilian locations in Algiers.  These acts of terrorism were met with the implementation 
of a curfew in Algiers and the torture of Muslim civilians by the military.  With political 
turmoil on the home front under President de Gaulle, France hosted the 1961 referendum, 
which revealed that the majority of Frenchmen and Algerians supported Algerian self-
determination (Branche, Thénault, Albert 94).  During this period of cease-fire a vigilante 
French militia, the Secret Army Organization (OAS), began some of the most atrocious 
acts of the war-period, with an average of 120 bombings per day in March of 1961 
(Windrow 542).  The Évian Accords came into effect on March 18th, 1962, granting 
Algerian Independence.  The war of independence was a victory for the Algerians but a 
moral loss for humanity with both sides committing countless atrocities:  murdering, 
kidnapping, raping, mutilating, bombing, and especially the targeting of civilians 
(including women and children). 
 The relationship between the French and the Algerians was not always gruesome.  
The two nations traded throughout these periods and continue to do so in modern times 
(Ruedy 164), but the history of violence between the two is almost certainly ingrained in 
the minds of the Frenchmen who oppose the immigration of North-Africans.  In 2005, the 
UMP passed the French Law on Colonialism which dictated that public schools in France 
must teach the positive effects of colonialism in an attempt to diminish the negative view 
the nation holds for their struggles as an imperial power.  The law was repealed one year 
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later, but the passing of it at all reveals a disapproving outlook on the history of French 
colonialism. 
 TUNISIA 
 Fifty years after the beginning of the French conquest of Algeria, France began 
spreading its North-African empire into Tunisia.  After the Ottoman’s defeat at the hands 
of Russia, the Congress of Berlin was held in 1878 to determine how the imperial powers 
would split territory in the Middle East.  France was given Tunisia as part of this 
agreement.  When Tunisian natives responded by raiding northern French Algeria in 
1881, France rapidly went on the offensive, sending over 30,000 troops to claim the 
territory.  On May 12th, 1881, the Treaty of Bardo was signed to formalize the 
protectorate status of Tunisia under French control.  As a protectorate the Tunisian 
leaders remained in office, but the French Resident-General soon garnered all the 
authority on political matters (Langer 56-58, 269). 
 Unlike Algeria, France’s relationship with Tunisia was rather peaceful.  This can 
be attributed in part to Tunisia’s small stature as a nation.  It did not have a vast 
countryside to hide rebels or a population large enough to form an insurgency.  So, 
generally, the Tunisians complied with French demands.  This was especially true during 
World War II, where even the independence leader Habib Gourguiba compelled Tunisian 
natives to comply with the French government for fear that Tunisia would be captured by 
Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy (Cohen 54). 
 Violence did break out for a short period in 1952, when a group of Tunisian 
nationalists used guerilla tactics against several French units, such as planting bombs on 
colonial facilities.  These attacks were the product of growing tension as Morocco was 
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granted independence and the Algerian War of Independence was beginning.  The French 
government attempted to grant a small amount of authority to local, Tunisian officials, 
but the gesture was seen as too little by the Tunisians and too much by the French 
Tunisians, creating unrest until the French government eventually relented and granted 
independence on March 20th, 1956 (Andrew and Kanya-Forstner 314). 
 MOROCCO 
 Beginning in the early seventeenth century, France and Morocco had generally 
amicable relations.  Pirates were an issue, like in Algeria, but the two regions had Spain 
as a common enemy, so Louis XIV supported Morocco.  But, after having begun to 
occupy Algeria and Tunisia, France began to look at Morocco as a potential protectorate 
(Ling 44).  The First Franco-Moroccan War took place in 1844, when the North-African 
nation chose to shelter Abd al-Qādir as mentioned previously instead of relinquishing 
him to French authorities.  France conducted a naval battle, beginning with the 
Bombardment of Tangiers.  Shortly after, France was successful in the land confrontation 
named the Battle of Isly against an organized Moroccan force.  And the war concluded 
with the Bombardment of Mogador, another French victory won by the naval fleet (Burke 
82).  The Treaty of Tangiers, in which Morocco formally recognized French Algeria, 
formally ended the war on September 10th, 1844.  Additionally, the treaty made Abd al-
Qādir an official outlaw in Morocco.  Abd al-Qādir surrendered to French forces in 
December of 1847 (Burke 97). 
 In 1911, Germany provoked the Moroccan forces, in an attempt to gain allies 
against France in the approaching war.  Moroccan forces attempted to siege the French 
city of Fez in what became known as the Second Moroccan Crisis.  The siege lasted one 
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month, at which time the French were able to defeat the Moroccans.  In the following 
year, the Sultan Abdelhafid was forced to sign the Treaty of Fez, which declared 
Morocco a French protectorate.  One month later, in opposition to the treaty, Moroccan 
forces attempted to mutiny the Fez garrison, but they were unsuccessful.  In September of 
1912, France continued to lay claims to Morocco by winning the Battle of Sidi Bou 
Othman and gaining Marrakesh as a base in southern Morocco (Porch 156). 
 In an attempt to instate a more acquiescent Moroccan leadership, France exiled 
the Sultan Mohammed V to Madagascar in 1954 and replaced him with Mohammed Ben 
Aarafa.  This sparked great controversy and opposition amongst the natives, who reacted 
by increasing violence towards French colonials.  In November of 1955, Mohammed V 
was returned to power and three months later France negotiated Moroccan independence 
(Gershovich 27). 
 Although France has been one of the most important trade partners with these 
three nations for the past century, France’s history in North-Africa is generally depicted 
as long and bloody.  Violence and resistance characterize nearly every period of North-
African colonialism.  Incorporation of the French identity (a “Frenchness”) is important 
in the French view of immigration, as the issue is seen as paramount to maintaining a 
collective culture and identity (Kuisel).  Throughout history, despite many attempts to 
force North-Africa to adopt the French way of life, France’s efforts have always been 
resisted, usually with hostility.  Perhaps the French feel that this has been true on the 
home front in the past few decades.  In Algeria, natives could adopt French citizenship, 
but to do so they had to, in a way, denounce Islam (Julien, Andre, and Le Tourneau 38).  
Algerians were allowed to continue practicing Islam, but subjection to French law which 
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forbids open practice of religion was seen by the Islamic community as a betrayal and 
abandonment of their faith; thus, many Muslims once again had opposing views with the 
French. 
 During the reconstruction period after the Second World War, France needed 
labor to help rebuild what the war had destroyed; therefore, the French allowed for a 
great number of immigrants to enter the country (Priestley 78).  The end of the Algerian 
War of Independence created entire Algerian communities in southern France.  But these 
groups were, once again, met with violent resistance.  The Paris Massacre of October 
1961 occurred when the Parisian police attacked a group of pro-FLN Algerians who were 
hosting a demonstration (Wilson 191).  Regardless of opposition to these groups, 
immigrants from North-Africa continued to arrive in France seeking jobs.  And this 
influx of immigrants has continued throughout the post-war decades.  Second and third 
generation immigrants have continued to experience hardships and intolerance from the 
French, but until the past decade, the French did not consider North-Africans a 
particularly dire threat to their own national identity.  But, as the last chapter showed, 
modern racism against North-Africans has become a critical issue—one that is 
particularly important in light of the historical conflicts between the French and the 
Maghreb.
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CHAPTER III:  Scholarly Research on the Impacts of Immigration 
 
 There are many reasons people choose to emigrate from one country to another:  
demography, family, society, politics, geopolitics, etc.  Regardless of the reasons, 
immigration has become an increasingly pressing issue since the end of World War II.  
Scholars have tried for decades to measure the effects of these movements of peoples in 
terms of their cultural, social, and economic impacts.  As shown in the previous chapters, 
France has a combative history with the nations of the Maghreb, and the consequences of 
emigration to France from this region have become very visible in the media.  Attacks 
against the Maghrebian French population have steadily grown over the last few years, 
indicating an opposition to the immigrant population.  While this paper will not delve 
into the cultural opposition that the French seem to have towards North-Africans, it will 
examine the possible economic reasons behind the growing antagonism.  To quote one of 
the leading researchers in this field of study, George Borjas, “Three central questions 
have dominated much of the research:  What is the contribution of immigration to the 
skill endowment of the workforce?  How do the employment opportunities of native 
workers respond to immigration?  And, who benefits and who loses?” (Borjas	  2006,	  pg.	  1). 
 Before one can understand how modern scholars examine the effects of 
immigration on a specific geographical location, it is important to have a conception of 
the basic economics that have greatly influenced the way most studies are conducted.  In 
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the simple model, there is one type of laborer who produces one specific good.  
According to the basic laws of supply and demand, the laborers wage is dependent upon 
how many workers are in the market.  When the labor market is saturated, employers will 
pay lower wages for each additional worker; likewise, when there are few workers in the 
market, employers will pay higher wages for the labor (Zaretsky 5). 
Graph 1:  Basic Wage and Supply 
 
 
 In Table 1 above, the x-axis represents the total number of unskilled workers (s) 
in the labor market.  The y-axis represents the wage (w) that each of these workers 
receives.  Point A is a hypothetical maximum wage value that can be attained when there 
are zero unskilled workers at the equilibrium market level.  Point D is the hypothetical, 
maximum number of unskilled workers that could be in the market.  Point B is the 
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equilibrium point in the market; this is the point where the most workers (s) are willing to 
work for the wage level (w1) provided.  Thus, when immigration increases, the supply of 
workers increases (as represented by the arbitrary values s  s*) and the wage each 
worker earn subsequently decreases (w1  w2).  In Graph 1, the equilibrium worker 
population and wage has shifted from B to C.  Obviously this is bad for the native 
laborers, and this decrease in wages is often cited as the most pressing problem with 
continued immigration. 
 But this is an incomplete view of the true effects of immigration on wages.  In the 
above case, laborers are perfect substitutes as there is only one type of laborer and one 
type of good.  But in reality there are multiple groups of workers.  Most scholars, for 
demonstration purposes, divide these groups into skilled and unskilled workers.  In the 
simple scenario, natives and immigrants are perfect substitutes for one another—they 
have equal worth and application in the workforce.  But in reality, this is often not the 
case.  Instead, immigrants are generally viewed as unskilled workers.  Of course this is 
not always the case, but immigrants typically earn less and have lower levels of education 
in their native countries than the country to which they have migrated.  Otherwise, they 
wouldn’t be migrating in the first place. Thus, in basic economic models concerning 
immigration with two levels of labor, most economists assume that immigrants arrive 
with a greater proportion of unskilled labor to skilled labor. 
 So, for another example, assume that all native workers are high-school graduates 
(skilled workers) while all immigrants have no education (unskilled workers).  In this 
scenario, the natives compliment the immigrants.  The natives take the high-skilled jobs 
while the immigrants take the low-skilled jobs.  Therefore, both groups gain from this 
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increase in the worker population, assuming the immigrants are better off with low-
skilled jobs in the new country compared to the country from which they migrated.  But 
how is the betterment generated by complimentary worker classes represented in Graph 
1?  The wage has decreased overall, but the blue box has now been redistributed to the 
skilled workers, giving them more opportunities for higher wages, thus making them 
better off.  And the triangle (BEC) shows the total gain of skilled natives. 
 For another example, assume that an amount of skilled and unskilled immigrants 
arrive in a country, and assume this amount is proportional to the native distribution of 
skilled and unskilled workers.  In these circumstances, the equilibrium will remain even, 
as both groups will increase proportionately.  And in a situation with two goods in the 
economy (instead of the previously assumed single good), assume that one good requires 
considerable unskilled labor and little skilled while the other good requires the converse.  
This way the new labor generated from immigration will still be split between the two 
goods, with possibly some high-skilled labor from the first good swapping to the second. 
 However, the problems with immigrations typically arise because natives and 
immigrants are not perfect compliments or perfect substitutes.  Scholars refer to 
immigrants as “imperfect substitutes,” because they displace (substitute) the low-skilled 
native workers.  But only some of these native workers are able to move into the skilled 
labor force.  Consequently, some natives are better off while those who remain in 
unskilled labor suffer lower wages. 
 And there are many other factors to take into account when attempting to analyze 
the effects of immigrants on a population.  Statistically, immigrants concentrate into 
urban areas.  Does this create problems for specific areas but not the surrounding cities, 
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or do natives respond by migrating to the surrounding areas to offset the effects of the 
immigrant-shock in the urban areas?  How long does it take for the effects of immigrants 
on wages to take effect?  In economic terms, when do the long-run effects begin and are 
the short-run damage to wage and employment levels worth the possible long-run 
rewards?  And how substitutable are native workers; do immigrants of equal skill and 
education replace them outside of theoretical models? 
 The empirical methods of analyzing the effects of immigration on the native 
population are still a fairly new science.  The first attempts to do so were conducted 
merely two decades ago (Card 1990 and Hunt 1992).  Named the “spatial correlation 
method,” this approach examines specific geographical areas.  The general consensus 
when using this approach was that immigrants had very little impact on the wages of 
natives, though the impact was somewhat negative.  But the flaw with this methodology 
is that a bias is formed whereby observations may be finding a correlation between the 
causes of migration and choice but not the consequences of migration choice (Edo 8).  
Additionally, the impact is lessened with the special correlation method because it does 
not account for natives who move away from immigrant-dense areas in order to prevent a 
decrease in their own wages. 
 The second notable methodology for examining the impacts of immigration is the 
“skill-cell approach” created by George Borjas (2003).  This system examines the entire 
nation’s labor market in order to eliminate the undesirable effects of the special 
correlation method.  Earlier, the theoretical model of immigration on the economy was 
shown to have different effects depending upon the number of skilled and unskilled 
workers in the labor market.  To account for this, the skill-cell approach breaks the 
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laborers down into groups based on their education levels and their years of experience in 
the workforce.  Thus, the immigrant share of the labor market at each level of the 
economy is calculated over time to calculate the impact on natives.  In doing so, Borjas 
concludes that a 10 percent increase in number of immigrant workers decreases native 
weekly earnings by four percent.  This negative impact is considerably higher than the 
levels recorded under the spatial correlation method.   
 While Borjas’s method does account for the skill levels of natives and 
immigrants, it falls short in that it assumes immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes 
at each level.  But as demonstrated in the theoretical model, this is not necessarily the 
case.  Additionally, the complimentary effects of physical capital are unexamined.  In 
other words, physically capital (technologies such as computers and assembly lines) 
compliments workers by allowing them to be more productive.  And over time physical 
capital will almost certainly adjust to make better use of an increase in the immigrant 
population in the labor market, as these technologies will evolve to compliment the levels 
of education and technical understandings of the migrant workers.  Giovanni Peri 
describes the potential benefits of immigration best, stating: 
Immigrations economic benefits mostly result from its effect on immigrant 
and native workers’ occupational choices, accompanied by employers’ 
investments and reorganization of the firm.  For instance, immigrants are 
usually allocated to manual-intensive jobs, promoting competition and 
pushing natives to perform communication-intensive tasks more 
efficiently.  This process, at the same time, reorganizes firms’ structure, 
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producing efficiency gains and pushing natives towards cognitive and 
communication-intensive jobs that are better paid.  (Peri 2010, pg. 6) 
 Immigrants and natives, even at the same education and experience levels, are 
unlikely to be perfect substitutes.  The reasoning for this is that there will almost certainly 
be cultural differences between the two, the most notable being language (Somerville and 
Sumption 16).  Lacking the cultural advantages of natives and likely competing in 
different job markets (communication vs. labor) thus makes immigrants imperfect 
substitutes to the native workers.  To account for this, the “nested constant elasticity of 
substitution” (CES), which observes the effects of capital and different types of labor, 
must be calculated and included, thereby forming the “structural skill-cell approach.”  
 Surprisingly, most studies that use this method find that immigration, in fact, has 
a positive impact on the wages of natives.  Part of the reason for this is that immigrants 
are shown to be substitutes not for natives, but for other immigrants.  Thus, they replace 
recent immigrants in the labor force, hurting their wages while natives remain mostly 
unaffected as low-skilled jobs while skilled workers continue to gain economic benefits 
from the reduced cost of labor.   
 Scholars have noted several other flaws with this model, but the most important of 
these is that this model makes the assumption that wages are perfectly flexible.  However, 
wages have shown to be downwardly sticky in France (workers are slow to accept cuts in 
the equilibrium wage) (Edo 10).  Even with these adjustments over time to the models for 
testing the effects of immigration, France remains an outlier.  Scholars have struggled to 
understand why results remain inconclusive as to how France’s immigrant population 
affects the native workforce.  Edo (2011) claims that scholars inability to calculate these 
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effects stems from their assumption that France has a perfectly competitive market when, 
in fact, wages are not as flexible in France as they are in many other developed nations.  
In other words, the price of labor cannot freely adjust to a supply shock.  For example, in 
1994, 92 percent of workers were covered by collective bargaining union contracts.  
France’s institutionalized wage rigidity must be taken into account if results of the 
economic effects of immigration are to be accurate.  And a secondary problem in 
determining wages in France stems from the country’s social programs.  Generous 
unemployment benefits and income support programs for non-workers may encourage 
some workers to accept unemployment over a decrease in their wages due to an 
immigration shock on the market (Edo 7).  Thus, with the many problems underlying the 
structural skill-cell model, this study will use the basic skill-cell model to examine the 
effects of immigrants on natives’ labor market outcomes. 
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CHAPTER IV:  Model to Determine the Impacts of Immigration in  
          France 
 
 This study will use the skill-cell model, as mentioned in the previous chapter.  
The specific model is heavily based on one proposed by Anthony Edo in his 2011 work 
concerning the effects of total immigration on the French labor market.  The measured 
years are 1990-2002.  This model will remove any bias that may occur by simply 
assuming only two levels of labor (skilled and unskilled).  Additionally, by examining the 
labor market outcomes for natives in the entirety of France, regional difference will be 
removed; this is particularly important as urban areas such as Paris and southern areas 
such as Marseille and Nice experience much greater immigrant supply shocks than urban 
areas experience. 
 As previous scholars have done, exclusively employed working men from the 
ages of 15-64 will be examined, as women often have periods of inactivity and 
unemployment which makes calculating the years of experience for a given cohort 
difficult.   
 As shown in the previous chapter, to determine the effects of immigrants on the 
labor market outcomes of natives, it is important to note the skill and education levels of 
both the immigrants and the natives.  This is because immigrants in different levels of 
education and skill are likely to replace natives at their respective levels.  So, to account 
for education and experience, the model will have three levels of education (graduates of 
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one to two years of education, three to four years, or five or more years) and eight levels 
of years of experience (1-40 years in five year increments).  Years of experience is 
determined by subtracting the number of years of schooling an individual has from the 
age that same individual has; the assumption is that individuals immediately enter the 
workforce after completing a given level of education.   
 Note that all data concerning the population has been pulled from the French 
National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE – Institut National de la 
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques).  Also, note that “Maghrebians” will be defined 
as persons who were born in Algeria, Morocco, or Tunisia and moved to France.  Even if 
these individuals acquire French citizenship, they will still be calculated as foreign labor.  
This is similar to the French view of immigrants (étrangers) as outsiders, as shown in 
chapter two.  The children of these immigrants will be considered natives, so they will 
not be included in the calculations.  But it is worth noting that the native French will 
likely view these children as immigrants despite their citizenship. 
 Once again, Edo’s model (which in itself is based after Borjas’s methodology) 
will be the defining one used for this study.  His approach examines immigrants and 
natives according to their levels of education (j) and labor market experience (k) during 
each year (t) from 1990-2002 to account for the substitutability between the immigrants 
and natives.  Previous scholars have used many different numbers of skill-cells, ranging 
from two (educated and non-educated in Card and Shleifer 2009) to six levels (low, 
medium, and high education along with drop-outs of all three categories in Edo 2011).  
For simplicity, and with the limited amount of data from the French census, this study 
will use three education groups, as described previously. 
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 But two people with the same level of education can still differ greatly in their 
value in the market.  If one graduate is a 22 year-old just entering the market, and the 
other graduate is a 50 year-old with 28 years of experience, the two will not likely be 
considered labor-market substitutes.  Obviously, most employers would choose to hire 
the person with market experience.  Accordingly, a secondary variable to account for the 
level of market experience each education group has attained will be used—the level of 
skill (experience).  This study will classify groups of workers into 8 different skill groups 
based on the number of years of market experience each group has attained.  The groups 
will be divided into five years increments (1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 
and 36-40).   
 Thus, there will be 24 “skill-cells” per year (3 education groups x 8 skill groups).  
With three education groups and eight experience groups over twelve years, this study 
has 288 observations.  With such a robust model, this study will be better able to examine 
the effects of immigration at all levels of the French economy and be more effective at 
reducing any problems of substitution that may arise.  There is no specific data in the 
French census on how long individuals have been in the market, however.  So to 
calculate a rough estimate of labor market experience for each cohort, this study will use 
the following equation (Edo 12): 
Potential Experiencei = Agei – Age of Ending Schooli 
 This equation does create two problems.  First, French employers may view 
native and immigrant labor-market experiences differently, generally favoring the former.  
And second, this measure does not account for periods of inactivity and unemployment.  
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Once again, the second issue is particularly important in why this study only examines 
the impact of male, foreign employed workers from the age of 15-64. 
 This study will focus on two specific labor markets outcomes:  wages and 
employment levels.  Employment levels are the more apparent concern in modern 
discourse of immigration, as natives are often concerned that they are being replaced by 
immigrants in their particular fields of work.  Immigrants may also have an effect on the 
wages of natives, as shown in the previous chapter.  Wages will be broken down into two 
dependent variables:  monthly and hourly wages, as often-times workers in the low-
skilled category may retain the same hourly wage but be offered fewer hours by 
employers and be faced with lower monthly wages.  Thus, both methods of monitoring 
wage levels will be used.   
 Employment levels will also be divided into two dependent variables:  
employment to population ratio of natives and employment to labor force ratio of natives.  
The employment rate of natives as a ratio of the total population should be sufficient to 
measure the rate at which immigrants replace natives.  However, because this variable 
can decrease as working conditions improve (due to a faster growth in the age of the 
working population), the employment rate to labor force ratio will also be included as a 
variable.  If this ratio decreases, it is because the working conditions for natives have 
decreased as well with an increase in unemployment.  By using these four dependent 
variables, the study will have robust results and account for many of the pitfalls of 
calculating the effects of immigration in past studies.  For estimates on these four 
variables at separate years, refer to Tables 3-6. 
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 The first of these variables this study will examine is wages.  Using the CPI 
deflator provided by INSEE, this study first calculates the average monthly wage for each 
native cohort.  Then, the monthly wage is broken down to include the hourly wage, as 
two laborers may have similar monthly wages while one of the two laborers works 
considerably more hours during the month.  However, INSEE does not give statistics on 
hourly wages, so this study will use an equation to estimate hourly wages.  The average 
hourly wage for each cell (j, k, t) is calculated with the equation (Edo 13): 
(Hourly Wage)jkt = (Monthly Wage)jkt / [(Hours per Week)jkt x 4] 
 The independent variable, as calculated by Borjas and subsequent scholars, will 
be the immigrants’ share of the labor force (pjkt).  If there is a decline in native wages or 
employment levels, this variable will show a correlation with the amount of immigrant 
labor present in the market.  In each skill-cell (j, k, t) this variable is found using the 
following equation: 
pjkt = Mjkt / (Njkt + Mjkt) 
 Here, Njkt represents the number of male natives in the labor force at each skill-
cell and Mjkt represents the number of immigrants present.  Another way of explaining 
this figure is that it allows us to examine the immigrant supply shock in each skill-cell 
during each year (t).  But, of course, Borjas and Edo both accounted for the effects of 
total immigration on labor markets.  Thus, for the purpose of this study, Mjkt will refer to 
the number of Maghrebian immigrants present in the labor market.  By using solely the 
number of Maghrebian, male workers while utilizing the same model, this study will be 
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able to examine the effects of an immigrant supply shock that is exclusively North-
African.  Below, Table 1 represents of these figures in balanced years.1   
Table 1 
Maghrebian Share of the Labor Force by Skill Cells (in percent) 
Level of Education Years of Experience 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
       
High Level 1 to 5 2 4.1 6.4 3.9 3.7 
 6 to 10 0.8 2 2.1 2.4 1.9 
 11 to 15 1.3 1.9 1.9 2.2 1.9 
 16 to 20 0.4 2.1 1.8 2.3 2.3 
 21 to 25 0.8 1.3 2.3 2.4 1.8 
 26 to 30 1.9 1.4 2.6 2.3 2.1 
 31 to 35 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.1 3.4 
 36 to 40 3.6 2.9 4.8 4.5 2.9 
 1 to 40 1.7 2.3 3.1 2.9 2.5 
       
Medium Level 1 to 5 6.2 9.6 6.3 10.1 9.1 
 6 to 10 2.7 3.5 5.3 4.8 3.3 
 11 to 15 2.1 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.8 
 16 to 20 1.8 3.1 3.1 2.4 2.1 
 21 to 25 2.1 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.3 
 26 to 30 1.9 1.9 2.9 2.2 2.3 
 31 to 35 2.3 2.4 3.2 3.1 1.9 
 36 to 40 3.9 2.3 4.1 4.3 4 
 1 to 40 2.9 3.5 3.9 4.1 3.5 
       
Low Level 1 to 5 15.6 18.7 20.2 19.5 16.2 
 6 to 10 8.4 10.2 11.2 12.9 10.8 
 11 to 15 4.4 6.4 9.3 9.7 6.9 
 16 to 20 3.9 8.2 6.1 7.2 5.8 
 21 to 25 2.8 7.6 4.9 5.5 4.4 
 26 to 30 3.2 4.1 4.8 5.4 4.1 
 31 to 35 1.9 3.8 4.4 5.1 4.1 
 36 to 40 2.9 4.5 5.1 5.8 4.4 
 1 to 40 5.4 7.9 8.3 8.9 7.1 
 
 Of particular note in Table 1 is that the Maghrebians hold a considerably larger 
portion of the labor force in the low-level and low-educated sectors of the market.  The 
gap between their inclusion in the low-levels versus their inclusion in the high-levels of 
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the market could indicate a substitutive effect between the natives and immigrants, as 
opposed to the desired complimentary effect.  This is assumed because, without an 
immigrant labor market distributed similarly to the native French one, there will be a 
larger supply increase in the category of unskilled laborers than the skilled ones.  And 
assuming immigrants will be willing to work for lower wages, they will then substitute 
native workers in the unskilled level market but not the skilled sector.  But if a 
proportionate amount of skilled and unskilled labor arrived, the French economy would 
simply grow. 
 Borjas (2003) uses the following equation to evaluate the impact of immigration 
on natives’ wages and employment rates: 
yjkt = α + β(pjkt) + δIh + δj + δk + δt + δj × δt + δk × δt + δj × δk + ξjkt 
 Here, yjkt represents the total labor market outcomes for native men with 
education (j) and experience (k) during year (t).  Ih is a dummy variable to account for the 
change in the number of workweek hours from 39 to 35 implemented in 2000 (Edo 16).  
This change affects the hourly wage, as the monthly wage remains constant, but the hours 
worked decreases, thus causing an increase in the hourly wage that must be accounted for 
in the model.  As Edo explains, 
In sum, Ih is a vector equal to 1 for each cell at time t ≥ 2000 and 0 
otherwise. In addition to including vector of fixed effects for schooling δj, 
experience δk and time δt, this model also contains a full set of second 
order interactions for schooling by time, experience by time and schooling 
by experience. The linear fixed effects in equation (1) control for 
differences in labour market outcomes across schooling groups, 
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experience groups, and over time. Interactions δj × δt and δk × δt control 
for the possibility that the impact of education and experience changed 
over time, whereas δj × δk control for differences in the experience profile 
by schooling group.  (Edo 2011, pg. 17) 
 It is important to find the ease with which immigrants can replace natives in the 
labor market.  So, to find the elasticity of native workers, this study will start with the 
ratio of immigrants to natives in a cell during a given year at each level of education.  To 
accomplish this, Edo uses the equation mjkt = Mjkt / Njkt.  Then the elasticity, represented 
by ∂yjkt / ∂mjkt , gives the change in natives’ wage and employment levels as a percentage 
that relates to the supply of immigrant labor.  This study, in keeping with Edo’s work, 
will use the following equation to calculate elasticity (17): 
∂yjkt / ∂mjkt  =  β / (1 + mjkt)2 
 The beta coefficient [β(pjkt)] will be converted to an elasticity for the purposes of 
providing real-world numbers to the regressions.  To change β to an elasticity, it will be 
multiplied by the mean value of the number of Maghrebian immigrants (m) or [1 / (1 + 
m)2].  The mean value (m) is .043 percent over the period in this study, 1990-2002.  Thus, 
the beta coefficient will be multiplied by .92. 
 In his own work, after calculating the logs of the average monthly wage, average 
hourly wage, average employment to population rate, and employment to labor force rate, 
Edo finds that “immigrant flows deteriorate the labour market opportunities of natives in 
France, leaving their wages unchanged.”  This indicates that natives and the total 
immigrant population are substitutes in production.  Specifically, using his 3x8x13 
model, he finds that a “10% increase in immigrant labour supply decreases native’s 
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employment to labour force rate by 2.7%,” (18-19).  This study’s results in finding the 
effects of solely the North-African immigrant population on the labor market outcomes of 
natives can be seen in Table 2 below. 
Table 2 
Impact of Maghrebians on the Labor Market Outcomes of Natives 
 Dependent Variable 
Specification: 
Monthly 
Wage 
Hourly 
Wage 
Employment 
to Population 
Employment 
to Labor Force 
Basic 
Regression -0.49 -0.5 -0.21 -0.19 
 (0.56) (0.54) (0.18) (0.15) 
     
Including Natives as                 
a Regressor -0.57 -0.62 -0.28 -0.22 
 (0.56) (0.59) (0.21) (0.17) 
     
Years of Experience   
between 5-35 -0.11 -0.22 -0.17 -0.19 
 (0.61) (0.62) (0.24) (0.23) 
     
Years of Experience 
over 10 -0.19 -0.25 -0.09 -0.16 
 (0.58) (0.56) (0.19) (0.17) 
 
 As expected, the findings of this study are very much in keeping with those found 
by Edo.  First, the top row of each regression shows the beta coefficient for each 
dependent variable, and the row underneath shows the statistical significant of each 
corresponding beta coefficient.  According to these findings, wages both hourly and 
monthly are not statistically significant, and thus, are not strongly affected by the 
immigrant population.  However, North-Africans do have an adverse effect on the 
employment opportunities of native workers, in both their relationship to the population 
and the labor force.  Thus, it is likely that immigrants and natives are labor market 
substitutes, as predicted.  According to the basic regression, a 10 percent increase in the 
supply of North-African labor decreases the employment opportunities of natives by 1.7 
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percent.  This figure is found by multiplying the beta coefficient to the elasticity (.91) 
shown earlier. 
 Three additional tests are done to determine to accuracy of the basic regression.  
First, another regression is run, using the log of the number of natives as an additional 
regressor. 
 Second, because the lowest and highest groups of experience levels amongst 
workers are volatile with laborers in these groups often entering and leaving the market, a 
third regression is run which excludes these two groups to account for possible variance 
that they may cause. 
 And third, similarly to the second additional test, a final regression is run which 
excludes workers with less than ten years of experience, as these groups are most affected 
by the minimum wage, which may reduce the effects of a change in wages after an 
increase in immigration. 
 All three of the additional tests show conclusive results similar to the baseline 
regression.  In all four examples this study shows that wages in France are unaffected by 
an increase in the supply of the immigrant labor force.  However, these immigrants are 
likely to substitute these workers and decrease their employment opportunities.  
Conclusions will be derived from these results in the next chapter. 
 While this study’s own statistical analysis is concluded, it is worthy of note that 
Edo derives an additional model that may be valuable for future scholars.  He offers 
another instrument to use in finding the effects of immigration on the labor market, “an 
instrument which incorporates the idea of social reproduction since parents’ educational 
attainment is strongly associated with their children’s educational attainment.”  One of 
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the problems with the skill-cell approach to calculating the effects of immigration is that 
it assumes each individual in the labor market acts independently of the labor market 
outcomes; immigrants often go to certain areas because they believe they can attain better 
wages there, and natives often respond to this movement.  The response from natives then 
diminishes the effects caused by immigrants.  However, by limiting the market to specific 
occupations, independent of geographic location, the effects may still be taken into 
account.  Thus, the measurement chosen to reflect the educational attainment of each 
individual’s parents is a division of the groups by occupational category (22). 
 Edo uses 29 occupational categories and divides them into the three previously 
established educational levels (low, medium, high).  Using this new model to calculate 
regressions in the same fashion as done previously, Edo finds that “a 10% increase in 
immigrant labour supply decreases native’s employment to labour force rate by 3.7%,” 
(24). 
 In conclusion, in both models, Edo finds that an increase in the number of 
immigrants has a negative impact on the French labor market by displacing native 
workers at the lower skill level.  These results reflect the substitutive nature of foreign 
and native immigrants in France.  In short, immigrants have lower reservation wages as a 
result of lower bargaining power, so employers are willing to higher immigrants at equal 
education and skill to natives for lower wages, thereby replacing natives in the market.
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CONCLUSION 
 There is not a perfect model to find the effects of immigration.  The effects of 
immigration on the labor market vary drastically according to which study is examined 
and which model it utilized.  For example, in the case of France, Ortega and Verdugo 
found that a 10 percent increase in the immigrant population lead to a three percent 
increase in the wage of natives.  Whereas, Edo, as shown previously, found that a 10 
percent increase in the native population led to a three percent decrease in the 
employment level of natives.  And across the globe, different geographic areas have 
found different effects when using different models. 
 This thesis found that North-African immigrants do have a negative effect on the 
labor market outcomes of natives.  As previously stated, a 10 percent increase in the 
number of North-African laborers in the market yields a 1.7 decrease in native’s 
employment to labor force rate.  However, it is important to note that this is substantially 
lower than impact of the total immigrant population.  In studying the effects of all 
immigrants on wages and employment levels, Edo found a 2.7 percent decrease in the 
dependent variable.  Thus, while North-Africans do have a negative effect on natives, 
they are not the immigrant group causing the most harm.  North-Africans have 
constituted slightly more than 30 percent of the immigrant population for the past two or 
three decades.  Europeans account for roughly 40 percent, and all other immigrants 
(mostly from other parts of Africa and Asia) account for the remaining 30 percent.  
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Perhaps these groups or the collections of fringe populations have had particularly 
adverse effects on natives.  Thus, although North-Africans do have a negative effects on 
the market, they are not the primary problem and thus unworthy of the political ire they 
have received. 
 The model used in this thesis does have several issues to note.  First, even if the 
results conclude that France has gained from the increased immigration, this might only 
be true on a national level.  As shown in the theoretical model, workers who compliment 
the unskilled labor of immigration benefit, but native unskilled workers may be forced 
out of the market by immigrants who are willing to accept lower wages.  Thus, an income 
disparity is created as unskilled workers receive lower wages and the skilled workers reap 
the benefits of the transfer.  The immigration surplus is the difference between what 
society gains from immigration and what those harmed by immigration lose; ultimately, 
not all natives will benefit from immigration because the two groups are not perfect 
compliments. 
Immigration, therefore, has two distinct consequences and these are 
precisely the consequences that drive the immigration debate. The nation, 
as a whole, gains from immigration. In other words, immigration increases 
the size of the economic pie available to natives. Immigration also 
redistributes income—from native workers who compete with immigrants 
to those who hire and use immigrant services. Immigration changes how 
the economic pie is split between workers and firms.  (Borjas 2006, pg. 
12) 
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 In a counter argument, however, Somerville and Sumption, in their examination 
of immigration’s effects on the UK claims, “There are almost certainly distributional 
effects… however, other factors such as education, trade, outsourcing, demographic 
change and technological change affect wages and employment much more than 
immigration [does],” (Somerville and Sumption 3).  Perhaps, the reason immigration is 
still one of the most debated factors when discussing changes on natives’ labor market 
outcomes is that immigration provides a physical face to the changes.  There is a visibly 
different “enemy” of sorts for people to rally against.  It is also one of the easiest factors 
to change.  Legislation that limits or expands the number of immigrants allowed to 
migrate to the host nation is much more easily levied than trying to monitor and set limits 
upon outsourcing and demographic change.   
 Next, it should be noted that the experience years given are possibly flawed in 
that natives and immigrants likely have very different experiences in their respective 
workforces.  Measuring these experiences is incredibly difficult though, so time spent in 
the workforce is the best representation of this variable for the time being. 
 Also, because this study uses census data, it does not attempt to calculate the 
effect of illegal immigration on the labor market.  This is probably for the best, as 
statistics on illegal immigration are often very biased and difficult to accurately estimate.  
But it must be noted that the effects of immigration on especially the lower education and 
skill groups will be more heavily effected than studies examining exclusively legal 
immigration will find. 
 Legislation can have a drastic impact on not only the amount of immigrants 
allowed into France, but also the skill and education levels of the immigrants.  This 
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legislation can’t be well represented in the statistics used, however, so the effects of 
immigration may be altered according to those restrictions.  Luckily, France rarely passes 
restrictions on immigration, but the recent law instituted in 2011 decreasing the amount 
of legal immigration by roughly 10 percent does reduce the effective number of years 
which the study and possibly future studies can use in formulating the regression. 
 This paper also does not account for social benefits used by immigrants.  This is 
especially important in the context of the immigrants’ families.  Only the effects of men 
on the labor force are measured in this study.  But how much of this additional output is 
used to support the women and children who are not contributing to the economy 
(assuming the women are not working as well) is not represented here.  In the same vein, 
women may also substitute native workers, but they are not taken into account in this 
study for reasons previously explained.  Though, if North-African women have levels of 
education and experience similar to those the men, they will likely have a substitutive 
effect in the labor and service markets like the men do.  These additional figures will 
likely lessen any positive effects of immigration or worsen any negative findings. 
 So, what are the implications that these mixed results have for public policy?  
First, policy should be very hesitant to make sweeping changes to the way in which 
immigrants are or are not allowed into a nation.  Because the effects of immigration are 
difficult to accurately estimate, it is best not to trust any single scholarly work when 
questioning whether or not immigration is positive or negative for an economy.  In the 
future, governments should keep the following points in mind when considering 
immigration policy: 
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• Immigration generally has minor effects for an economy.  These effects can be 
positive or negative, but note that other factors have greater effects on the labor 
market outcomes of natives. 
• The low-skill native groups who will be most affected by the substitutive effect of 
immigration should be prioritized and considered first before passing 
immigration.  This has typically been done in the past by allowing high-educated 
laborers to enter the market under work visas. 
• Employment standards such as minimum wages and weekly hours must be 
enforced.  Do not allow immigrants to be exploited, as employers will allow this 
cheaper source of labor to undercut native workers. 
• Allow immigrants access to adult training or child education to generate social 
mobility and allow integration into communities to create a more complimentary 
native and immigrant labor force. 
 Because the study of immigration is still very new, and the results are very mixed 
and debated based on different models and different information used, the political 
implications concerning immigration on a national level should generally err on the side 
of caution.  Ultimately the most important conclusions to derive are that immigration is 
worthy of further study. 
 So how should issues of immigration be resolved and monitored in the future?  
First, polling systems such as Opinion Way are very useful in discovering the native 
population’s sentiments on immigrant groups.  And knowing these sentiments can be 
worthwhile in determining whether or not immigration should be limited or expanded to 
allow for better societal cohesion and reduce any sentiments of social unrest.  Work visas 
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have also been an invaluable tool in assessing the labor status of immigrants; programs 
such as these that promote diversity amongst the labor classes of immigrants are 
essentially to insuring a broad working class and in preventing unrest due to an over-
populated, under-educated level of the group. 
 In conclusion, this study examines the racism that North-Africans are 
experiencing today and the history that these nations have had with France.  But, as the 
results in this thesis show, perhaps not all of the xenophobia is unwarranted.  By a 
sociological and moralistic point of view, the French attitudes towards the Maghrebians 
are unjustifiable.  But on an economic level, this group of immigrants does appear to 
harm the employment levels of natives.  However, North-Africans harm natives 
substantially less than other immigrant groups, so they should not be the primary target of 
political discussion when aiming to quell the effects of immigration on the native labor 
market.  And lastly, further study is needed in examining the economic effects of 
immigrants on the native population, as different studies using different models have 
shown drastically different results.
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Table 3 
 
Total Number of Native Men in the Labor Force by Skill-Cells 
Level of 
Education 
Years of 
Experience 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
       
High 
Level 1 to 5 369017 346488 222767 314299 389349 
 6 to 10 459531 360631 477358 450951 522949 
 11 to 15 438643 445485 523326 457784 526767 
 16 to 20 539601 403058 491502 495363 477144 
 21 to 25 497824 473770 565758 468033 549669 
 26 to 30 445606 456092 466750 485114 542035 
 31 to 35 379461 427807 459678 433870 404618 
 36 to 40 351611 424271 328847 317716 393166 
 1 to 40 3481294.3 3337601.2 3535987.1 3423129.9 3805697.1 
       
Medium 
Level 1 to 5 375854 252226 237155 374101 471697 
 6 to 10 519272 380718 428897 665068 605702 
 11 to 15 588508 423549 595410 717027 664664 
 16 to 20 766544 528247 686235 748202 777228 
 21 to 25 751707 818544 787152 711831 723626 
 26 to 30 771489 880411 837610 784573 766507 
 31 to 35 257163 728124 701372 680656 836190 
 36 to 40 509381 747160 772014 524781 514578 
 1 to 40 4539916.7 4758979 5045844.7 5206238.5 5360191.8 
       
Low 
Level 1 to 5 479476 327645 437031 475698 422950 
 6 to 10 577999 588547 584599 627810 616802 
 11 to 15 715930 685627 703789 644404 728414 
 16 to 20 761907 794842 749195 669296 740163 
 21 to 25 972089 904057 817304 757797 834152 
 26 to 30 952384 964732 868385 785454 887020 
 31 to 35 1142861 928327 828655 840768 863523 
 36 to 40 965521 873720 686762 730141 781283 
 1 to 40 6568166.8 6067497.4 5675720.4 5531367.6 5874307.1 
       
Total Native 
Workforce 14589378 14164078 14257552 14160736 15040196 
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Table 4 
Total Number of Maghrebian Men in the Labor Force by Skill 
Cells 
Level of 
Education 
Years of 
Experience 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
       
High 
Level 1 to 5 7380 14206 14257 12258 14406 
 6 to 10 3676 7213 10025 10823 9936 
 11 to 15 5702 8464 9943 10071 10008 
 16 to 20 2158 8459 8847 11393 10974 
 21 to 25 3983 6159 13035 11240 9894 
 26 to 30 8467 6385 12136 11158 11383 
 31 to 35 9107 11551 14250 13449 13757 
 36 to 40 12658 12304 15785 14297 11402 
 1 to 40 53131 74741 98278 94689 91760 
       
Medium 
Level 1 to 5 23303 24214 14941 37784 42925 
 6 to 10 14020 13325 22732 31949 19987 
 11 to 15 12359 13130 19053 22228 18610 
 16 to 20 13797 16376 21273 17957 16322 
 21 to 25 15786 18007 21232 19219 16643 
 26 to 30 14658 16728 24291 17261 17630 
 31 to 35 5915 17475 22443 21100 15888 
 36 to 40 19866 17185 31652 22565 20583 
 1 to 40 119704 136440 177617 190063 168588 
       
Low 
Level 1 to 5 74798 61270 88280 92761 65818 
 6 to 10 48552 60032 65475 80987 66615 
 11 to 15 31501 43880 65452 62507 50251 
 16 to 20 29714 65148 45701 48189 42929 
 21 to 25 27218 68708 40048 41679 36703 
 26 to 30 30476 39554 41682 42415 36368 
 31 to 35 21714 35276 36461 42879 35404 
 36 to 40 28001 39317 35024 42348 34376 
 1 to 40 291974 413185 418123 453765 368464 
       
Total Maghrebian 
Workforce 464809 624366 694018 738517 628812 
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Table 5 
Average Monthly Wage of Natives by Skill Cells 
Level of 
Education 
Years of 
Experience 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
       
High 
Level 1 to 5 1511.9 1580.6 1951 1529.3 1659.9 
 6 to 10 1702.5 2220 2189.7 1948.8 2035 
 11 to 15 1989.8 2452.1 2820.6 2453.6 2440.7 
 16 to 20 2142.1 2489 2530.2 2714.1 2880.9 
 21 to 25 2492.1 2630.3 3102.1 2684.5 3000.2 
 26 to 30 2584.6 2761.6 2916 2988.5 3137.1 
 31 to 35 2565.7 3075.4 2980.1 3037.5 3407.8 
 36 to 40 2661.7 3034.2 4516.5 3426.6 3373.9 
 1 to 40 2206.3 2530.4 2875.8 2597.9 2741.9 
       
Medium 
Level 1 to 5 849.5 1196.4 1127.3 1006.6 1110.7 
 6 to 10 974.8 1133.6 1220 1164.6 1279.6 
 11 to 15 1151.8 1330.2 1578.7 1296.4 1405.9 
 16 to 20 1301.1 1467.3 1367.1 1440 1508.2 
 21 to 25 1426.4 1532.4 1543.9 1565.1 1651.7 
 26 to 30 1550.4 1588.7 1963 1643.9 1739 
 31 to 35 1496.9 1683 1952.2 1776.6 1797.3 
 36 to 40 1480.9 1887.4 2056.5 1775.1 1869.6 
 1 to 40 1279 1477.4 1601.1 1458.5 1545.3 
       
Low 
Level 1 to 5 714.2 826.8 808.8 858.3 963.5 
 6 to 10 844.9 983.1 1017.2 1053.6 1115.6 
 11 to 15 982.9 1101.9 1282.7 1140.2 1214.5 
 16 to 20 1100.9 1202.8 1238.3 1246.3 1327.7 
 21 to 25 1156.9 1299.5 1434.1 1319.8 1407.4 
 26 to 30 1204.9 1364.6 1374.6 1423.6 1521.4 
 31 to 35 1252.8 1665.8 1429.9 1517.8 1541.7 
 36 to 40 1213.3 1408.7 1492.4 1523.4 1608.5 
 1 to 40 1058.9 1231.6 1259.7 1260.4 1337.5 
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Table 6 
Average Hourly Wage of Natives by Skill Cells 
Level of 
Education 
Years of 
Experience 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
       
High 
Level 1 to 5 9.2 9.5 11.6 9.4 10.6 
 6 to 10 10.3 13.1 12.9 11.7 12.9 
 11 to 15 12.1 14.4 16.1 14.2 15 
 16 to 20 13.4 14.5 14.6 15.8 17.2 
 21 to 25 14.8 16 18 15.8 17.5 
 26 to 30 15.9 16.7 17.5 17.8 18.6 
 31 to 35 15.3 17.8 17.6 18.9 20.7 
 36 to 40 15.4 17.8 26.8 20.5 20.2 
 1 to 40 13.3 15 16.9 15.5 16.6 
       
Medium 
Level 1 to 5 5.2 7.3 6.9 6.3 7.4 
 6 to 10 6 6.9 7.4 7.2 8.5 
 11 to 15 7.1 8.1 9.7 8 9.2 
 16 to 20 8 9 8.4 8.9 9.9 
 21 to 25 8.8 9.4 9.5 9.6 10.8 
 26 to 30 9.6 10.2 12.1 10.2 11.4 
 31 to 35 9.3 10.3 11.9 11 11.7 
 36 to 40 9.2 11.8 12.7 11 12.3 
 1 to 40 7.9 9.1 9.8 9 10.1 
       
Low 
Level 1 to 5 4.3 5.1 5.1 5.4 6.5 
 6 to 10 5.2 6.1 6.3 6.6 7.4 
 11 to 15 6 6.8 7.8 7.1 8 
 16 to 20 6.8 7.4 7.6 7.8 8.8 
 21 to 25 7.1 8 8.8 8.2 9.3 
 26 to 30 7.4 8.4 8.5 8.8 10 
 31 to 35 7.8 10.2 8.8 9.4 10.2 
 36 to 40 7.6 8.6 9.2 9.4 10.5 
 1 to 40 6.5 7.6 7.8 7.8 8.8 
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